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CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER 5.0 
Omari Scott Simmons* 
INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary business environment requires an enhanced chief legal 
officer (CLO) role.  Since the Great Recession of 2008, the demands placed 
on CLOs have increased.1  Today’s business environment is characterized by 
technological disruption, increased activism by shareholders and other 
stakeholders, a regulatory environment emphasizing internal controls, and 
private ordering instead of prescriptive regulation.  At the same time, delivery 
methods in the legal services industry are undergoing a massive 
transformation,2 driven in part by technological innovation.  If handled 
ineffectively, these complex demands threaten corporate value. 
The enhanced CLO role is an element of a corporate immune system, 
which “is a collection of internal processes and mechanisms that have been 
developed to protect corporations by identifying and eradicating threats to 
their economic value,” such as managerial shirking and opportunism.3  Other 
elements of the corporate immune system often include, inter alia, board 
oversight, compliance and risk management systems, and remuneration.4  In 
a sense, modern CLOs perform “an embedded internal regulatory function,”5 
which includes “monitoring, formulating company procedures and policies, 
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 1. See ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, 2019 ACC CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS SURVEY 2–7 (2019), 
https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/resources/upload/2019-ACC-Chief-Legal-Officers-
Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PEY-QFCQ]. 
 2. See George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services 
Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2006). 
 3. Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System:  Governance from the Inside 
out, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1136. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1144. 
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and enforcement.”6  As another advantage, “[t]his internal regulatory 
function [arguably] lowers the monitoring costs for government actors.”7 
The CLO role falls within the monitoring model of corporate governance 
that has become the favored policy response to economic turmoil and 
contemporary scandals.8  The monitoring model emphasizes procedures, 
internal controls, compliance, and risk management “as tools to address 
agency costs [i.e., transaction costs], particularly problems of asymmetric 
information and managerial opportunism.”9  The modern CLO role is best 
expressed in terms of value creation,10 a “dynamic concept involving the 
interaction of multiple parties and activities in the employment of corporate 
resources.”11  In-house counsel value is not simply limited to individual 
value-producing activities.  “[I]t also encompasses the networked and 
embedded nature of the role, which contributes to the enhancement of 
corporate value and competitive advantage in unique ways that outside 
counsel cannot easily replicate.”12 
The CLO role is inherently strategic rather than tactical.13  It involves 
consistent interaction with corporate operations and a multiplicity of actors, 
enabling the corporation to significantly enhance its creation and 
preservation of value.14  Generally, CLOs’ fiduciary obligations and 
 
 6. Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers:  A Unifying Theory of the In-
House Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 138 (2011). 
 7. Id.; see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance:  
What Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 
547–48 (2008) (explaining that the government, through policies and regulations, has 
encouraged companies to have higher ethical standards as well as effective compliance 
programs). 
 8. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1144. 
 9. Id. at 1145. 
 10. There are numerous formulations of the value-creation concept in the business 
literature. See, e.g., TIM HINDLE, GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT IDEAS AND GURUS 201–02 (2008).  
These issues elicit considerable debate on what metrics are the best proxies for corporate value 
(e.g., stock price, accounting or book value, net present value of future cash flows). Id.  For 
example, financial experts may focus on metrics such as share price or book value as a proxies 
for value, whereas marketers may rely on more intangible measures, such as perceived 
customer value above cost. Id.  Legal observers such as Ronald Gilson have also applied the 
value-creation concept to business lawyers. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business 
Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1985); see also Steven L. 
Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy:  In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497, 
498 (2008). 
 11. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 84. 
 12. Id. Most definitions of business lawyer value creation in the legal literature, although 
useful, are descriptively too narrow because (1) they are limited to transactional sources of 
value; (2) they are fragmented; or (3) they fail to capture the unique value that stems from in-
house counsel linkages, networks, and integration with other firm activities. Id. at 110 (“By 
contrast, our theory is not limited to transactions as traditionally envisioned, but also 
encompasses intangible and non-transactional sources of value, such as corporate compliance, 
which help directors and officers fulfill their oversight duties.”). 
 13. Id. at 84–85 (“When completed by competent professionals with well-honed ethical 
sensibilities, the strategic tasks that in-house counsel undertake add value because they are 
fundamentally different from the largely tactical outside law firm role.”). 
 14. Id. at 83 (“Examples such as failure to comply with a federal regulation, a poorly 
written supply contract, or a mishandled product lawsuit, all constitute a threat to corporate 
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representation serve, in the following order:  (1) the corporation, (2) the chief 
executive officer (CEO), and (3) everyone else.15  This order of priority is 
especially important where conflict arises.  CLOs are both leaders and 
lawyers, and must continuously navigate the tension between these 
responsibilities.  Simply being a highly proficient tactical lawyer is 
insufficient.16  CLOs, leading an entire legal department and sometimes 
having other corporate functions, are charged with ensuring that corporate 
clients receive quality advice on an ongoing basis. 
Given the fast pace and growing complexity of the financially focused 
business environment, the CLO must creatively and intelligently engage 
internal clients and a range of third parties, which requires a diverse and 
deeper set of competencies.  The CLO of the future should have a skill set 
that resembles a T shape.17  Here, the vertical line represents acute legal 
acumen and the horizontal line represents additional competencies that allow 
the CLO to bridge multiple constituencies.  Specifically, these additional 
competencies include, inter alia, (1) sophisticated procurement capabilities, 
(2) an enhanced financial focus, and (3) a global enterprise risk-management 
 
value.  Prudent corporate managers cannot wait until such threats materialize; they require a 
type of consistent and strategic guidance that in-house counsel are uniquely positioned to 
provide.”).  CLOs mitigate threats to corporate value as well as proactively capture 
opportunities. Id.  Value can be both tangible and intangible and the particular metric for value 
may vary depending on the context or particular vantage point. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); E. 
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional 
Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 8–13 (2006) (explaining 
that tensions may arise because of in-house counsel’s relationship with corporate management 
and in spite of these tensions in-house counsel “must exercise independent judgment on behalf 
of the corporate client when advising directors, officers, and employees of the client”); see 
also Gillian Tett, Does Capitalism Need Saving from Itself?, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/b35342fe-cda4-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f [https://perma.cc/ 
4WZ2-EGNN]; Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An 
Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-
corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/X992-
XPE3] [hereinafter Business Roundtable]. 
 16. A CLO has to create an environment of collaboration, support, and teamwork as 
opposed to an insecure environment caused when the CLO’s words do not parallel action. 
Interview with Thomas L. Sager, Former Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel of DuPont 
(Aug. 14, 2019).  Additionally, a CLO who overemphasizes CEO- and board-oriented 
activities at the expense of other corporate constituencies may prove ineffective. Id.; see also 
Ben G. Pender II, Note, Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor as Steward in 
Ethical Culture and Governance at Client-Business Organizations:  From 21st Century 
Failures to True Calling, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 91, 96 (2009) (“Although many business 
organizations frame and articulate corporate conscience through written policies, ethics codes, 
and compliance management programs, policies, codes, and compliance programs alone are 
inadequate to operationalize an ethical corporate conscience.”). 
 17. See R. Amani Smathers, The 21st-Century T-shaped Lawyer, LAW PRAC., July/Aug. 
2014, at 32; see also Scott F. Norberg, Summary of the Proceedings, 13 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 
313, 332 (2019) (summarizing the remarks of Fernando Garcia, general counsel and 
government affairs and corporate secretary of Nissan Canada).  See generally ELAINE MAK, 
THE T-SHAPED LAWYER AND BEYOND:  RETHINKING LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES (2017). 
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orientation.18  Performing this enhanced role, however, may be subject to 
challenges and limitations. 
This Essay builds upon the business-lawyer value-creation literature by 
analyzing the contemporary CLO and argues for an enhanced CLO role.19  It 
emphasizes the sometimes ignored and underemphasized demand-side 
considerations involved in the provision of legal services.  These demand-
side considerations will help to predict the competencies and expanded skill 
sets CLOs will need to navigate the challenging contemporary business 
environment.  Part I of this Essay discusses CLOs’ sophisticated purchasing 
competencies.  It explores how CLOs have revolutionized legal service 
provision by addressing problems stemming from information asymmetries 
between the client corporation and external legal service providers.  Part II 
examines how the contemporary CLO role is more financially focused, 
placing greater demands on legal departments to articulate their value to 
corporate managers.  Part III explores the importance of global enterprise risk 
management and the impact CLOs can have in capturing and preserving 
economic value.  Part IV addresses potential challenges and concerns related 
to the proposed enhanced CLO role.  The Essay concludes that the 
contemporary business environment facing global companies requires an 
enhanced CLO role reflecting a broader range of competencies.  As a matter 
of prediction and aspiration, it maps out key competencies contemporary 
CLOs should possess. 
I.  SOPHISTICATED PURCHASING COMPETENCIES 
CLOs function as sophisticated purchasers who help companies make a 
key decision:  whether to make or buy legal services.20  If they opt for the 
latter, questions arise as to which external service provider(s) to use and for 
which types of matters. 
 
 18. Jena McGregor, Group of Top CEOs Says Maximizing Shareholder Profits No Longer 
Can Be the Primary Goal of Corporations, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/lobbying-group-powerful-ceos-is-
rethinking-how-it-defines-corporations-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/RA3S-LFG7]. 
 19. This Essay often uses “CLO” as a proxy for the entire corporate legal department. See 
generally Gilson, supra note 10, at 243 (“If what a business lawyer does has value, a 
transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, as a result of the lawyer’s participation.” 
(emphasis omitted)); Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 498. 
 20. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) 
(asserting that, in order to minimize transaction costs, it may be optimal to bring various labor 
functions within the firm to prevent costly “spot” labor market transactions); Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:  Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. 
ECON. REV. 112 (1971) (analyzing the benefits of internalization versus external 
procurement); Corporations Are Adding to Their In-House Legal Departments, Cutting 
Outside Expenditures, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/corporations_are_adding_to_their_in_house_legal_departments_cutting_ou
tside [https://perma.cc/9L2T-ACDU] (“Large corporations worldwide switched their 2013 
legal spending from outside law firms to in-house law departments.”). 
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A.  Nature of Legal Services:  Experience and Credence Characteristics 
The value of legal services is a function of cost and quality.21  Whereas 
cost is relatively transparent from service provider invoices, quality is often 
more difficult to discern.  Economists identify three types of goods:  (1) 
search goods, (2) experience goods, and (3) credence goods.22  In the search 
goods context, the search process prior to consumption readily reveals the 
quality of the goods.23  Search goods have “low pre-buying costs of quality 
detection.”24  On the other hand, the quality of experience goods cannot be 
discerned during the search process but only during or after consumption.25  
These goods have “high pre-buying costs of quality detection” but low post-
buying costs of quality detection.26  Examples include many jobs, movies, 
newspapers, wine, and food.27  The quality of credence services—such as 
certain medical services, automobile repairs, and education—cannot fully be 
determined after the search process and even following a significant period 
after consumption.28  They have “high pre-buying costs and high post-buying 
costs of quality detection.”29 
Legal services most closely reflect experience and credence services, 
making the client corporation vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior of 
service providers seeking to extract higher profits or rents.30  If the services 
are experience services, their quality can be detected earlier than that of 
credence services; that is, during or immediately after use.31  Nonetheless, 
the client company may still fall prey to opportunistic behavior; for example, 
if the service provider is not interested in repeat business and tries to extract 
a hefty “one-off” premium.  However, the risk of losing future business may 
constrain and discipline the conduct of many service providers.32 
 
 21. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 106–07. 
 22. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal:  The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal 
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006) (listing the three types of goods); see also 
Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. 
& ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973); Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. 
ECON. 311, 311 (1970). 
 23. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 1600.  The quality of search goods, such as clothing, 
footwear, and jewelry, can readily be discerned during the search process prior to 
consumption. Id. 
 24. MEN-ANDRI BENZ, STRATEGIES IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE AND CREDENCE GOODS 
2 (2007); see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 311 (analyzing consumer behavior with respect 
to search and experience goods). 
 25. See Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 68. 
 26. BENZ, supra note 24, at 2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 68–69 (“Credence qualities are those which, 
although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.”). 
 29. BENZ, supra note 24, at 2. 
 30. Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 311 (analyzing consumer behavior with respect 
to search and experience goods).  On the other hand, the quality of experience goods is not 
discernable during the search process but rather after consumption. See Darby & Karni, supra 
note 22, at 80. 
 31. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 1600. 
 32. See Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 68 (explaining that the profits of many 
businesses depend on client relationships, which are “implicit understanding[s] that the 
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Credence services expose an even greater asymmetry between buyers and 
sellers concerning knowledge about quality.33  In the legal services context, 
quality will be difficult to determine or require costly information and other 
circumstances;34 for example, a considerable time lapse.35  Credence 
characteristics create two types of asymmetry based on customers’ inabilities 
to determine their needs or accurately diagnose a problem and the level of 
service necessary.36  By controlling the interplay between diagnosis and 
service provision, the service provider can exacerbate the customer’s 
dilemma because “consumer ignorance and [the] additional cost of separate 
diagnosis and repair provide motivation [or incentives] for a service firm to 
defraud its customers.”37  The veracity risk is higher when “information may 
be filtered and possibly distorted to the advantage of the [service] firm that 
has assumed the information collection responsibility.”38  A broader range of 
overreaching service provider conduct falling short of fraud is still 
problematic; for example, inferior work product and lack of punctuality may 
still work to the detriment of the corporate client. 
In the legal services context, CLOs can disrupt service provider overreach 
and opportunism in several ways.  As sophisticated purchasers within the 
corporation, they can help to mitigate information gaps associated with 
experience and credence services.39  Their embedded legal acumen enables 
them to help diagnose problems and, equipped with data-driven tools, they 
can collect and analyze reliable information about the proposed service, 
thereby creating more value for their companies.40  For example, a data 
analysis of contracts might reveal costly errors and gaps for which the service 
provider bears responsibility.  Similarly, data analytics might reveal that a 
law firm’s recommended litigation strategy has not generated desirable 
results commensurate with its costs.  CLOs’ guidance is not simply ex post; 
they can provide valuable predictive guidance to assist ex ante decision-
making.41 
 
customer will return for future services so long as he does not detect fraud or low quality 
services.”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 69. 
 36. See Brian Roe & Ian Sheldon, Credence Good Labeling:  The Efficiency and 
Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1020, 1020 
n.1 (2007) (“[O]nly an expert can diagnose the consumer’s true needs, e.g., does the car need 
a minor or major repair? . . .  [O]nly the seller may know the level of service actually provided, 
e.g., was the car given the appropriate level of service?”). 
 37. Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 77. 
 38. Williamson, supra note 20, at 120. 
 39. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 108–09. 
 40. Rebecca M. Lamberth et al., Alternative Fee Arrangements:  Who’s Responsible for 
Making Them Work?, 22 CAL. LITIG., no. 2, 2009, at 11, 14–15. 
 41. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 108.  With access to internal control 
mechanisms as well as ongoing internal relationships, in-house counsel can gather information 
more efficiently and at a lower cost, allowing them to conduct more precise ex ante and ex 
post evaluations of corporate legal performance.  Otherwise, the external acquisition of this 
information could be costly and increase veracity risks, where “information may be filtered 
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B.  Bundling 
CLOs must also be attuned to the issue of service provider bundling.  
Bundling involves a single service provider performing a range of 
differentiated tasks for a single client.42  At first, bundling services can seem 
to be a win-win proposition for both customer and service provider.43  For 
the corporate customer, purchasing bundled services can save money.  
Bundling, in essence, offers a volume discount, where the corporate customer 
gets more product or services at a lower per-unit cost.44  For the seller or 
service provider, bundling is a way to generate additional revenue.45  The 
efficacy of the standard “Costco” volume discount, involving a single 
product, hinges on buyers’ actual need for more product or service.46  
Similarly, cable television customers may continually pay for access to 
hundreds of channels they do not watch.47 
When service providers offer corporate clients a bundle of differentiated 
professional services rather than a standard volume discount—that is, various 
products versus more of the same product—the potential for information 
asymmetries and service provider overreach increase.48  Thus, bundling, 
involving differentiated services, requires greater sophistication and 
monitoring prowess.  Beyond the primary service offering, ancillary bundled 
services must provide additional value to the customer; otherwise, they are 
as superfluous and wasteful as surplus services provided at a standard volume 
discount.  However, in the bundled context, monitoring and discerning value 
across a range of differentiated services can be more complex and 
burdensome, and bundling can also significantly increase the corporate 
customer’s switching costs.49 
As sophisticated purchasers of legal services, CLOs are crucial in 
diagnosing the legal issues; determining what type, level, and mix of services 
 
and possibly distorted to the advantage of the [third party service] firm that has assumed the 
information collection responsibility.” Id. 
 42. Lamberth et al., supra note 40, at 14–15. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Vanessa Page, How Costco Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/070715/costcos-business-model-smarter-
you-think.asp [https://perma.cc/KSG9-3BAD]. 
 45. Lamberth et al., supra note 40, at 14–15. 
 46. Brad Tuttle, Costco Is Facing a Looming, Bulk-Sized Problem, TIME (Mar. 10, 2014), 
https://time.com/18671/costco-is-facing-a-looming-bulk-sized-problem/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6CQT-CU4H]. 
 47. Jonathan Berr, Why Americans Are Watching Fewer TV Channels, FORBES (July 31, 
2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanberr/2019/07/31/why-americans-are-
watching-fewer-tv-channels [https://perma.cc/S2K3-BUUE] (describing how “the average 
TV household had access to nearly 200 channels” in 2018, but only watched an average of 
12.7 channels). 
 48. Toby Brown, Pricing Legal Services:  Alternative Fee Arrangements, ADVOCATE, 
Winter 2017, at 31, 32–33 (explaining that true cost savings, as opposed to a discount, require 
general counsels to “engage in planning, scoping, and budgeting”). 
 49. Patrick Greenlee et al., An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT’L 
J. INDUS. ORG. 1132, 1134 (2008) (“Employing a bundled loyalty discount imposes switching 
costs on customers because a customer that shifts some purchases to a rival seller pays a higher 
unit price for the quantity still purchased from the incumbent.”). 
1748 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
are needed; deciding whether to provide them in-house or procure them from 
an external provider; and analyzing their value.50  Technological 
advancements in data collection have made in-house analysis and 
measurement of service provision more effective.51  Consequently, the power 
dynamic between the corporate client and external legal service provider can 
be significantly altered to the client’s benefit.52 
C.  Disintermediation 
Today, companies are eschewing intermediaries and external service 
providers in a number of areas.  Disintermediation53—that is, eliminating 
middlemen—may be desirable where in-house counsel can perform work 
previously provided by external law and other service firms.54  Technological 
advances, particularly in the artificial intelligence (AI) arena (e.g., machine 
learning), are displacing lawyers and changing legal service delivery 
 
 50. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 107–10. 
 51. Reena SenGupta, Tech, Data, and Compliance Are Converging to Transform 
Business, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d3cba350-d845-11e8-
a854-33d6f82e62f8 [https://perma.cc/RFV9-MVBX] (“[L]egal and compliance data touch so 
many parts of a business that collecting, harmonising and analysing it yields useful insights 
about vendors, customers and staff.”). 
 52. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:  A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 902–03 (1990) (explaining how a corporation can generally 
save money by internalizing legal services instead of hiring outside counsel).  Gilson 
comments on the shift in power between the client corporation and external legal providers. 
Id. (“As Robert Mnookin and I stated four years ago, ‘[g]eneral counsel for major corporations 
are creating a revolution and are the primary agents of change.’  Increasingly, general counsel 
are former partners in large corporate firms who are capable of internalizing both the 
diagnostic and referral functions they previously performed on behalf of clients as outside 
counsel.  The critical difference is that internalizing these functions eliminates the information 
asymmetry between client and lawyer, so that no relationship specific assets are created and 
no lock-in effect results.  The consequence is a dramatic reduction in the switching costs facing 
clients and an elimination of lawyers’ market power.”). 
 53. See MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE FUTURE OF WORK IN AMERICA:  PEOPLE AND PLACES, 
TODAY AND TOMORROW 99 (2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/ 
Featured%20Insights/Future%20of%20Organizations/The%20future%20of%20work%20in
%20America%20People%20and%20places%20today%20and%20tomorrow/The-Future-of-
Work-in-America-Full-Report.ashx [https://perma.cc/2QFU-N5CX] (predicting that 
automation and AI could replace 23 percent of all lawyers); Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital 
Middlemen and the Architecture of Electronic Commerce, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 795, 798 n.8 
(1998) (predicting disintermediation’s effect on the legal profession, where lawyers are 
middlemen between information and the clients); cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 
GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008) (explaining disintermediation’s role in “enabling companies to 
access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other 
financial intermediaries”).  See generally Tom C. W. Lin, Infinite Financial 
Disintermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643 (2015) (discussing disintermediation in the 
financial industry). 
 54. Sarah Kellogg, The Uncertain Future:  Turbulence and Change in the Legal 
Profession, 30 WASH. LAW. 18, 21 (2016) (explaining that 67 percent of law firms surveyed 
in 2016 stated they were “currently losing business to corporate law departments that are in-
sourcing legal work”). 
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methods.55  Just as the law firm convergence movement employed strategies 
to reduce the number of external service providers and thus reduce costs and 
improve the quality of service,56 the implementation of AI technology 
foreshadows another major shift in service delivery.57  This shift inevitably 
will impact the number of external as well as in-house lawyers needed to 
serve corporate client needs.  But most importantly, AI frees lawyers up to 
spend more time on productive, value-producing activities.  Instead of 
routine tasks, the modern CLO can spend more time collaborating with 
business partners on strategic issues than their historical counterparts could.58  
Equipped with useful data and a more strategic orientation, the modern CLO 
can better engage the board and C-suite executives, bridging historical 
silos.59 
D.  Expansive View of Legal Services 
In the contemporary context, CLOs should adopt a more expansive view 
of corporate service needs and acquisition options, rather than a narrow 
traditional focus on legal services alone.  From a company’s demand-side 
perspective, legal services are quite similar to other types of professional 
services.  Today’s legal service providers are not limited to law firms but 
include the “Big Four” accounting firms—PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), and KPMG—and legal tech companies.60  
The alternative legal service provider (ALSP) market represented an 
estimated $10.7 billion in 2017 revenue and is increasing at an annual rate of 
nearly 13 percent.61  The ALSP industry can be divided into five segments:  
 
 55. Jane Croft, The Relentless Advance of the Super-Intelligent Attorney, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 
5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/af3e2a64-a069-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2 [https:// 
perma.cc/MW69-VJ6P]. 
 56. See generally THE NEW REALITY:  TURNING RISK INTO OPPORTUNITY THROUGH THE 
DUPONT LEGAL MODEL 2 (Silvio J. Decarli & Andrew L. Schaeffer eds., 5th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter NEW REALITY]. 
 57. Croft, supra note 55. 
 58. Richard Susskind, the world’s most cited author on the future of legal services, 
provides a clear illustration of the changing legal landscape. See Bloomberg Law, How A.I. 
Will Excel at Legal Work, YOUTUBE (May 24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
Qec14tbNVg [https://perma.cc/F7WX-5S5J]; see also Julie Sobowale, How Artificial 
Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal Profession, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2016), http:// 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_lega
l_profession [https://perma.cc/K2NM-9FYL] (discussing how technology automates tedious, 
low-value tasks and allows lawyers to devote more time to high-value, analytical tasks). 
 59. See Sterling Miller, Artificial Intelligence and Its Impact on Legal Technology:  To 
Boldly Go Where No Legal Department Has Gone Before, THOMSON REUTERS (“As CEOs and 
CFOs become more accustomed to using AI, they will expect the other members of the C-
Suite—including the general counsel and legal department—to follow suit.  In-house lawyers 
that embrace AI, will become more valuable to the next generation of CEOs and CFOs.”) (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 60. David B. Wilkins & Maria J. Esteban Ferrer, The Integration of Law into Global 
Business Solutions:  The Rise, Transformation, and Potential Future of the Big Four 
Accountancy Networks in the Global Legal Services Market, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 981, 
982 (2018). 
 61. THOMSON REUTERS, ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 2019:  FAST GROWTH, 
EXPANING USE AND INCREASING OPPORTUNITY 3 (2019), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/ 
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the Big Four ($1.2 billion), captive legal process outsourcers (LPOs) ($300 
million), independent LPOs ($7.4 billion), managed services ($700 million), 
and contract and staffing services ($1.1 billion).62 
The Big Four accounting firms, subject to ethics and local bar rules, are 
already supplanting law firms in the tax advisory space and beyond.63  
Typically, they have strong, and sometimes “cozy,” C-suite connections with 
chief financial officers (CFOs) and corporate finance departments as well as 
relationships with fraud and investigative units.64  They generally categorize 
their practices as audit and non-audit.65  The obvious driver of this division 
is the risk of conflicts, as well as the perception of conflicts.66  Despite a 
modest legal presence in the United States, they are arguably the world’s 
largest law firms,67 employing armies of lawyers in Latin America, Europe, 
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.68 
The work of the Big Four and traditional law firms is generally 
distinguished as lower-cost, high-volume work versus more strategic, higher-
cost, low-volume work.69  Examples of the former include compliance, data 
privacy, and labor law work.70  The latter might include high-level board 
advice; for example, defending a shareholder fiduciary duty lawsuit.  
Notably, the Big Four often have direct control over a team of full-time 
lawyers who are not outsourced or contract talent.71  Their vertical 
integration allows them to provide one-stop solutions for major corporate 
 
content/dam/ewp-m/documents/legal/en/pdf/reports/alsp-report-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7J2T-Y2XN] [hereinafter ALSP REPORT]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 982. 
 64. Id.; see also ALSP REPORT, supra note 61, at 4; Interview with Big Four Accounting 
Principal (Aug. 27, 2019). 
 65. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 997 (“[T]he real growth in the development of 
each of the Big Four’s legal networks has come from their ability to sell legal services to the 
vast majority of companies around the world that are not their audit clients.”). 
 66. Id. at 997–98. 
 67. John Fitzgerald, The Big 4:  An Existential Threat to Law Firms?, LAW.COM (Mar. 18, 
2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.law.com/mid-market-report/2019/03/18/the-big-4-an-
existential-threat-to-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/4XT6-UAVR] (“PwC Legal had already 
become the world’s sixth largest legal services provider, by headcount, in 2017.  Indeed, 
between them, the Big 4 average well over 2,200 lawyers in 72 countries.”). 
 68. Jonathan Derbyshire, Big Four Circle the Legal Profession, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 15, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9b1fdab2-cd3c-11e8-8d0b-a6539b949662 [https:// 
perma.cc/X4N9-DVBP] (“PwC employs 3,600 lawyers in 98 countries; EY has 2,200 lawyers 
in 81 countries; KPMG about 1,800 lawyers in 75 jurisdictions; and Deloitte has more than 
2,400 lawyers on its books.”). 
 69. Dan Packel, Big Law’s Trojan Horse:  Are the Big Four Preparing an Invasion?, 
LAW.COM (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/11/29/big-
laws-trojan-horse-are-the-big-four-preparing-an-invasion/ [https://perma.cc/NMM3-JLDT]. 
 70. See Interview with Big Four Accounting Principal, supra note 64. 
 71. Id. 
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clients.72  Insiders estimate that their fees are roughly 30 percent lower than 
those of major law firms.73 
Outside the United States, CLOs are more likely to encounter direct, robust 
competition for legal and advisory work among a wide range of professional 
service providers:  law firms, large accounting firms, legal tech companies, 
and management consultancies.74  A CLO seeking legal due diligence in 
India, for example, may forgo hiring a traditional law firm and engage an 
ALSP.75  The shift to ALSPs abroad is not without critics.  In the United 
Kingdom, the potential conflicts created by bundled service offerings have 
prompted proposals to spin off the Big Four’s audit functions from their other 
services (e.g., legal).76  More law firms would be supplanted in the United 
States if not for jurisdictional rules affecting the ownership of legal service 
providers.77  Abroad, ownership requirements are less restrictive.78  Some 
observers contend that the present U.S. regulatory structure impedes 
innovations that might benefit American companies and their stakeholders, 
and some jurisdictions are lowering ownership barriers,79 but the patchwork 
of rules continues to inhibit experimentation.80  Such restrictions are often 
justified as protecting the quality of professional representation.81  Critics 
contend that they are actually rooted in efforts to eliminate competition for 
traditional legal service providers—law firms.82  To the extent that quality 
and professionalism concerns are eliminated, the justifications for restricting 
ALSPs do not outweigh demand-side, value-based concerns.  Notably, even 
law firms employ ALSPs in serving their own corporate clients, and this 
indirect use is growing in popularity.83  For example, “[m]ore than half of 
large law firms use ALSPs for five or more functions, with the most common 
being e-discovery, legal research, litigation and investigation support, 
 
 72. Derbyshire, supra note 68 (“Over the past decade, the accounting firms have sought 
not to replicate the large law firm model but rather to refine an integrated services model that 
operates at the intersection of tax, finance, consulting, strategy, information technology and 
project management.”). 
 73. See Interview with Big Four Accounting Principal, supra note 64. 
 74. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 998–1000. 
 75. See Interview with Big Four Accounting Principal, supra note 64. 
 76. Derbyshire, supra note 68. 
 77. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 1006. 
 78. Id. at 998–1000. 
 79. See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Toward the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 49 (2015). 
 80. See generally Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 997–1000 (describing how the Big 
Four have experimented more with alternative business structures in global jurisdictions that 
are less strict about legal service provision than the United States). 
 81. Sam Skolnik & Amanda Iacone, Big Four May Gain Legal Market Foothold with 
State Rule Change, BLOOMBERG L.:  BIG L. BUS. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://biglawbusiness.com/ 
big-four-may-gain-legal-market-foothold-with-state-rule-change [https://perma.cc/V58K-
P58L] (explaining that some lawmakers have considered these restrictions “necessary to 
protect the public, by defending legal professionalism and the ability of lawyers to maintain 
independence of judgment”). 
 82. See id. 
 83. ALSP REPORT, supra note 61, at 5–6. 
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document review/coding, and non-legal/factual research.”84  Survey results 
underscore this trend: 
Around 65 percent of large law firms are using ALSPs for e-discovery 
purposes, compared to 42 percent just two years ago.  Half of large law 
firms are currently using ALSPs for legal research, compared to just 21 
percent two years ago.  Non-legal and factual research was cited as a use 
by 54 percent of large law firms in 2018, up from 32 percent.  Litigation 
and investigation support jumped to 52 percent from 33 percent, and 
document review/coding is now used by 52 percent of large law firms, up 
from 38 percent.85 
In some instances, client corporations are pressuring law firms to make 
greater use of ALSPs.86 
Ironically, ALSPs can both collaborate and compete with traditional law 
firms.87  The fact that corporate legal departments have significantly 
increased their use of ALSPs is not surprising, but, according to a recent 
survey, cost is cited as only a tertiary factor.88  According to the survey, the 
primary reasons that companies use ALSPs are to access expertise they lack 
in-house and to use their own resources (e.g., in-house lawyers) more 
strategically and efficiently.89  Corporate legal departments are highly 
unlikely to completely outsource legal functions.  For cost and other reasons, 
CLOs may decide to bring or keep certain functions in-house.  Although 
ALSPs offer an appealing option, they do not eliminate CLOs’ key make-
versus-buy decisions or their professional, legal, and ethical obligations.90  
Despite inroads by ALSPs, CLOs must still remain attentive to jurisdictional 
restrictions and professional ethics rules. 
E.  Service Industry Disruption 
The legal services industry is experiencing structural change and, some 
observers might contend, a technological revolution—or, at a minimum, 
evolution.91  AI has already displaced “Big Law” associates who once 
 
 84. Id. at 5. 
 85. Id. at 5–6. 
 86. Id. at 11. 
 87. Id. at 10. 
 88. Id. at 7–8. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 760 (“[T]he 
alternative to buying outside is ‘making’ in-house—in this case by hiring in-house counsel to 
provide direct legal advice and information about outside lawyers.  When clients have the 
technical expertise to dispense with specialists and can figure out on their own which 
individual lawyers are reliable and meet their specific needs, they will have less need to buy 
outside legal services based on personal relationships with individual lawyers or to rely on a 
stable of ‘preferred provider’ Big Law firms.  The increased role of in-house counsel is 
therefore a significant threat to Big Law.”). 
 91. Croft, supra note 55.  Such transformation is not limited to the legal services industry.  
Consider transformations in other contexts and domains such as investment banking.  Today, 
“90 [percent] of the economic profit made in the capital-markets industry is now earned on 
the buy side—that is, by those who manage assets or investments—and just 10 [percent] from 
sell-side investment banking activities.  A decade ago . . . that split was closer to 50-50.” A 
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dedicated time to routine document review and due diligence.92  Machine 
learning, which enables qualitative analysis of legal documents, such as 
contracts and briefs, will have a profound impact on the legal services 
market.93  Already, machines can draft briefs in a fraction of the time a law 
firm associate would need94 and, as a consequence, the demand for Big Law 
associates is likely to continue to wither.95  The greater availability of legal 
data will drive decision-making about legal services,96 with ramifications for 
litigation and deal strategies, evaluating intellectual property, improving 
business processes, helping digital transformation, and delivering new 
business insights in such areas as multiterritory risk assessment and 
analysis.97 
II.  ENHANCED FINANCIAL FOCUS 
The CLO role is more financially driven in today’s environment where 
data-informed decision-making looms large.98  In-house legal departments 
are often viewed as cost centers or non-revenue-generating corporate 
functions as opposed to a revenue-generating business unit.99  However, a 
broader, more accurate view recognizes the legal department’s role in 
revenue generation.100  An important facet of the CLO role is to communicate 
the value of the legal department to key internal and external stakeholders.101 
In-house counsel provide value to shareholders by mitigating two primary 
types of transaction costs:  (1) costs between management and ownership and 
(2) costs between the corporation and outside service providers.102 
 
New Era at Goldman Sachs Starts in the Shadow of a Scandal, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/04/15/a-new-era-at-goldman-
sachs-starts-in-the-shadow-of-a-scandal [https://perma.cc/YF2S-48UG]. 
 92. Croft, supra note 55 (“[Artificial intelligence] automatically reads and extracts 
relevant information from the documents under review in a fraction of the time, and more 
consistently, than humans.”). 
 93. See Sarah Murray, Algorithms Tame Ambiguities in Use of Legal Data, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/50b0eba4-d063-11e8-9a3c-5d5eac8f1ab4 
[https://perma.cc/2GXQ-SQJF] (“[T]he next step is to enable machines to make qualitative 
analyses of legal documents.”). 
 94. See Interview with Big Law Managing Partner (July 11, 2019). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally LEXISNEXIS MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, THE PROFITABLE LEGAL 
DEPARTMENT:  HOW LEGAL DEPARTMENTS CAN PROSPER BY GENERATING REVENUE FOR THEIR 
COMPANY (2010), http://www.europeangc.com/uploads/Profitable%20Legal%20Department 
%20Full%20report_A4_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5GS-DZ6L]. 
 99. Id. at 5. 
 100. Id. (“It is a duty . . . for in-house legal teams to recuperate any monies due to the 
corporation, outside normal duties such as dealing with labour law matters, contracts, or 
regulation and compliance.”). 
 101. Id. at 23–24 (describing how the general counsel is responsible for convincing 
stakeholders to support a legal recovery program and then proving to stakeholders that the 
program is yielding positive results). 
 102. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 95–96. 
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A.  Transaction Costs Between Management and Ownership 
CLOs and their departments figure prominently in corporate managers 
satisfying their fiduciary duties (e.g., care and loyalty).103  Here, their 
engagement coupled with financial acumen can help mitigate serious risks to 
corporate value.  In assisting their client corporations, today’s CLOs must be 
conversant and comfortable with their company’s balance sheets, financial 
drivers, and risks.  They must also sometimes be willing to serve as a check 
or counterweight to other C-suite executives such as the CEO and CFO, even 
if it results in dismissal.  Litigation and government investigations can bring 
significant legal and financial risks.  For example, in the public disclosure 
context, an overly aggressive CEO or CFO may advance statements in public 
securities filings (e.g., 10-K, 10-Q, etc.) that may lead to serious litigation 
and reputational risks.104  Additionally, the CLO and the corporate legal 
function are often crucial to corporate managers satisfying their oversight 
duties—that is, implementing a system of internal controls that allows for 
information flow to managers.105  The corporate compliance, sustainability, 
government affairs, and other functions often report to or frequently interact 
with the CLO and legal department.  Thus, CLOs and corporate legal 
departments loom large in addressing agency costs between managers and 
shareholders in the contemporary business environment. 
B.  Transaction Costs Between the Corporation and Outside Service 
Providers 
1.  Less Dependence on Big Law 
With respect to the latter category of transaction costs between the 
corporation and external service providers, CLOs and corporate legal 
departments create and preserve value in multiple ways.  In the market for 
professional services, CLOs as sophisticated purchasers must consider cost, 
quality, and value.  In a common formulation, value is a function of cost and 
quality.106  Although a service provider’s reputation can serve as a heuristic 
for quality, value is not a function of service provider cost and reputation 
 
 103. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 & cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2018) (describing the CLO’s responsibility to learn of and report breaches of fiduciary duties). 
 104. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NO. 353, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (1976) 
(on file with author).  The Securities and Exchange Commission found in the mid-1970s that 
financial statements of companies making sensitive payments invariably were distorted to 
conceal or obscure those payments. Id. at 8.  This falsification “cast[s] doubt upon [a 
company’s] whole system of accounting” which is an “essential component of the disclosure 
system.” Id. at 6–7; see also, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
2042 (2017) (discussing securities purchasers’ right of action against the issuing company or 
individual for any material misstatements or omissions in disclosure statements). 
 105. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (explaining managers’ 
oversight duties of implementing and monitoring internal company controls). 
 106. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 106–07. 
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alone.107  CLOs cannot easily justify the arbitrary hiring of their former law 
firm colleagues where more valuable service provider options exist.  Large, 
midsized, and smaller firms as well as ALSPs are all potentially valuable 
service options that CLOs must consider in their value-creation role.108  
Within the contemporary financially focused environment, corporate legal 
departments are arguably less dependent on traditional Big Law firms. 
The reasons for giving ALSPs serious consideration are also pragmatic.  
Traditional large law firms may have conflicts in many areas, and the 
litigation landscape has changed dramatically over the past thirty years.109  
Rather than court-based litigation, today’s corporations often prefer 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for business-to-business and consumer 
disputes,110 especially in the international context.111  These factors require 
a more nuanced approach to sourcing services from a mix of providers. 
2.  Financially Influenced Law Department Innovations 
CLOs and corporate legal departments also limit transaction costs through 
such practices as convergence, recovery programs, alternative billing 
arrangements, and streamlining law department operations. 
a.  Convergence 
The law firm convergence movement began when major companies, such 
as DuPont and General Electric, significantly reduced the number of law 
firms they engaged in order to reduce skyrocketing legal costs.  Overall, 
“[i]nnovations such as law firm partnering and convergence can be viewed 
as attempts to extract more value from outside firms via more ongoing, 
 
 107. Id. (“[C]orporations are seeking value added beyond law firm reputation. . . .  Other 
components of value, such as responsiveness and cost, can make a less reputable firm more 
attractive to the client corporation.”). 
 108. See id. at 107 (“Depending on the type of legal work involved, multiple firms may 
adequately perform the task. . . .  Thus, a five-star law firm may not be necessary where a 
three-star firm will suffice.”). 
 109. See Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16. 
 110. See E. Norman Veasey & Grover C. Brown, An Overview of the General Counsel’s 
Decision Making on Dispute-Resolution Strategies in Complex Business Transactions, 70 
BUS. LAW. 407, 415 (2015) (“A key advantage of international arbitration is the relative 
certainty (if all goes well in the process) of being able to enforce the award through the 
available international conventions . . . .”). 
 111. See generally id. (providing an extensive discussion of the pros and cons of arbitration 
and situational factors influencing general counsels’ decisions to litigate in courts versus 
pursuing ADR).  Confidentiality is one of the primary reasons arbitration is preferred over 
litigation.  The benefits of confidentiality include:  “recurring future business with the 
counterparty; secret commercial or scientific information; concerns about the company’s 
reputation; not revealing certain business or litigation strategies; not upsetting customers with 
a public display of problems, such as uncertain supply; and the like.” Id. at 416.  The benefits 
of ADR, however, can be undermined by the following:  (1) a retained litigation firm 
discourages ADR in pursuit of more lucrative fees; (2) executives such as the CEO and CFO 
may not wish to experience disruption or dedicate the time needed to actively participate in 
ADR; (3) parties’ perceived strength of their cases; (4) the risk to the CLO of obtaining an 
undesirable recovery; and (5) the strength of the parties’ relationship. Id. at 416–17. 
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mutually beneficial relationships that provide greater opportunities for law 
firms to develop more in-depth knowledge concerning the client’s 
business.”112  Notably, the convergence movement targets both the quality 
and cost of legal services.  It holds that, when law firms operate more as 
strategic partners en route to solving the client corporation’s problems, the 
client receives greater value. 
b.  Recovery Programs 
The goal of recovery programs is to inspire greater vigilance in the 
corporation’s pursuit of its rights.  This might entail pursuing contractual 
claims that sales personnel routinely disregard due to their perceived 
insignificance, yet when properly quantified, in the aggregate, account for 
serious losses.  In essence, “the intent of a recoveries program is simply to 
ensure that the legal department identifies and pursues those legitimate 
claims that otherwise might be missed for various reasons.”113  Despite 
requiring intervention and possible disruption of established business 
relationships, recovery programs fall within the purview of the corporate 
legal department because, “[w]hether corporate legal departments like it or 
not, companies assert claims formally and informally every day, even 
without a recovery program.”114  They recognize that, in the business 
process, “things sometimes go wrong:  services are not delivered on time, 
products are shipped in a defective condition, company property is 
negligently damaged by another party, warranties are breached, etc.”115  
Revenue-conscious CLOs can proactively and systematically implement a 
recovery program to capture opportunities that are often overlooked across 
companies’ entire business operations.  Doing so, they can better articulate 
their value to management. 
c.  Alternative Fee Arrangements 
Compensation functions as a mechanism to incentivize desired behavior.  
Alternative billing arrangements attempt to impose greater discipline and 
better incentives that ostensibly encourage service providers to deliver 
greater value to corporate clients.116  Experimentation with varied fee 
arrangements (e.g., fixed, formula, and performance-based), rather than 
overemphasizing the billable hour, arguably discourages opportunism and 
better aligns service providers and corporate clients.  CLOs can optimally 
 
 112. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 148.  See generally NEW REALITY, supra note 
56.  DuPont was one of the first companies to take this direction and a large number of 
companies have followed. 
 113. LEXISNEXIS MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 98, at 6. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Brown, supra note 48, at 32–33 (explaining that true cost savings, as opposed to a 
discount, require general counsel to “engage in planning, scoping, and budgeting”); see also 
Lamberth et al., supra note 40, at 14–15. 
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employ a mixture of alternative fee arrangements customized to meet the 
needs of a particular business context. 
d.  Streamlining Law Department Operations 
Operational changes can make corporate legal departments more nimble, 
efficient, and cost-effective.  CLOs engage in a consistent process of 
streamlining law department operations in order to meet the needs of 
corporate clients.  This requires, inter alia, attention to internal legal 
expertise, costs, technology, and efficient deployment of personnel.  For 
example, corporate legal departments are developing greater process and 
project management capabilities.  Process management often involves 
eliminating unnecessary work steps and costs,117 whereas project 
management “is the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques 
to project activities to meet the [specific] project requirements.”118  Another 
example of streamlining law department operations involves large company 
law departments locating their employees in less expensive cities to control 
costs and attract top talent who might be reluctant to relocate to very 
expensive cities like Seattle or Palo Alto.119  For example, Oracle and Cisco 
now have significant legal operations in the Research Triangle Park (RTP) 
of North Carolina.120  For Cisco, RTP is its largest legal outpost outside of 
Silicon Valley.121  These smaller cities bring multiple advantages:  lower 
costs, highly educated talent, and multiple career opportunities. 
III.  GLOBAL ENTERPRISE RISK-MANAGEMENT ORIENTATION 
The modern CLO must have a panoramic view of business risks extending 
beyond the United States.122  Lawyers are sometimes the primary interface 
with new geographies and essential to discerning how to set up a business or 
address ground-level regional concerns.123  Accordingly, they must sensitize 
CEOs, other C-suite executives, and boards to a range of problems, legal and 
extralegal. 
 
 117. See generally JEFFREY K. LIKER, THE TOYOTA WAY:  14 MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
FROM THE WORLD’S GREATEST MANUFACTURER (2004). 
 118. What Is Project Management?, PROJECT MGMT. INST., https://www.pmi.org/about/ 
learn-about-pmi/what-is-project-management [https://perma.cc/P8XP-E6U7] (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2020). 
 119. See Wake Forest Law Events, Sager Speaker Series with Mark Chandler on Mar. 20, 
2019, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6t0BjL5XYI 
[https://perma.cc/F59K-M9TD]. 
 120. See Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16. 
 121. See Wake Forest Law Events, supra note 119. 
 122. See Kellogg, supra note 54, at 22 (“Globalization of the legal profession is dramatic 
and dynamic and will continue.  As time goes on, I expect that we’ll be dealing with other 
countries much the way we deal with other states.”). 
 123. See Yasmin Lambert, Wanted:  Lawyers at Full Throttle, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c8ff241a-5f5e-11e9-b285-3acd5d43599e 
[https://perma.cc/L8A7-9C3J]. 
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Enterprise risk management (ERM) is an overarching theme that has added 
salience in today’s business environment.124  It “is an enterprise-wide attempt 
to ensure that corporations address risks in the business process” and often 
involves identifying, analyzing, and managing them via internal controls.125  
However, legal risks are only “one subset of risks that should be incorporated 
into business decisions.”126  Others may be financial, reputational, 
operational, or related to human resources and brand equity.127  CLOs must 
recognize not only the various types of risk but how they interact.  Here, 
CLOs, as insiders or “innkeepers” with intimate knowledge of business 
operations, are uniquely positioned to add value.  Any sound risk-
management strategy for large companies in the contemporary context 
requires a global perspective.  CLOs can raise awareness and keep 
management apprised of regional and cultural risks to help protect corporate 
value.  The following sections describe potential risks in more detail. 
A.  Knowledge of Global Regulatory Architecture 
CLO competence includes a strong sense of the global regulatory 
framework across geographical boundaries.128  From a regulatory standpoint, 
CLOs must be aware of international trade laws—including tariff regimes, 
sanctions, export controls, and restrictions on investment—that influence the 
 
 124. For an overview of enterprise risk management’s development, see Betty Simkins & 
Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 571, 577–86 (2008). See also In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 
A.2d 106, 127–28 (Del. Ch. 2009) (shareholder suit alleging directors breached fiduciary 
duties pursuing excessively risky strategies); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and 
Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 969 (2009); Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing 
Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act:  Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 59 (2011) (“In the absence of rigorous ERM obligations under state 
corporate law and in the wake of the recent financial crisis, Congress has taken steps to impose 
federal regulation on risk management oversight.  In July of 2010, Congress adopted the 
[Dodd-Frank Act].”).  See generally CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BD., 
THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 10 (2006), 
https://www.conference-board.org/pdfdownload.cfm?masterProductID=3840 [https:// 
perma.cc/UNU7-G5BM]; MATTEO TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD., EMERGING GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (2007), https://www.conference-board.org/ 
pdfdownload.cfm?masterProductID=1251 [https://perma.cc/46AM-M9EY] (outlining 
elements of ERM). 
 125. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1146; see Bainbridge, supra note 124, at 981 (“[E]nterprise 
risk management can be understood as a form of agency cost control analogous to . . . law 
compliance programs, and internal controls.”). 
 126. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1146. 
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control regarding material manufactured in China.”). 
 128. ALM INTELLIGENCE & MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, GENERAL COUNSEL UP-AT-
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maintain a culture of compliance regardless of geography, but also act locally in establishing 
policies and procedures to ensure corporate action meets the prevailing local regulatory 
standards.”). 
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company’s domestic and foreign operations.129  For example, General 
Motors sells more Buicks in China than in the United States,130 and ongoing 
trade disputes with China pose a significant risk to its business.131  Even 
largely domestic firms may pivot toward a more global outlook as domestic 
markets mature and become saturated with their goods and services.132  This 
dynamic may necessitate an expansion strategy targeting foreign markets and 
channels. 
B.  Cultural Competence 
The CLO’s global competence must go beyond a mere sense of regulatory 
frameworks to encompass a keen cultural competence.133  As business 
operations expand, and companies seek additional market outlets for their 
products and services, the need for global, regional, and cultural sensibilities 
becomes apparent.134  CLOs are selected because of their legal acumen and 
because they speak the language and understand the culture of the 
business.135  For example, Alexander Hamilton was DuPont’s first corporate 
lawyer for these reasons; he spoke French and, most importantly, understood 
the business culture.136  His effectiveness as a corporate lawyer is often 
overshadowed by his other contributions.137  Hamilton’s centuries-old 
example reflects the contemporary need for an expanded CLO skill set, 
which includes cultural competence.  Culture is like the operating system of 
the corporation and, even if not readily visible to outsiders, it can have a 
significant impact on risk management, compliance, and other business 
outcomes.138 
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 131. See Ferris, supra note 130. 
 132. Neil Kokemuller, The Disadvantage of Market Saturation, HOUS. CHRON., 
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantage-market-saturation-69967.html [https:// 
perma.cc/CMK5-VBLE] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“When an existing product market or 
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 133. See Eichbaum, supra note 129 (“Ultimately, a global general counsel should know, 
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Cultures (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 
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From a legal procurement perspective, CLOs must rely on a diverse 
network of worldwide legal service providers, both traditional law firms and 
ALSPs, and form regional teams to address ground-level business 
concerns.139  They must have sufficient cultural awareness to leverage these 
resources to serve corporate clients who desire cost-effective 
multijurisdictional solutions. 
C.  The New Normal of Shareholder and Stakeholder Activism 
Shareholder and stakeholder activism are the new normal.140  
Consequently, a growing number of large companies have proactive and 
reactive investor-engagement committees that usually report to the CEO or 
CFO.141  They are often staffed with outside counsel, crisis management 
professionals, consultants, and securities experts.142  While CLOs may not 
frequently sit on them, they can advise the board of directors and the CEO 
on how to respond to activist demands.143  As a matter of strategy, the CLO 
might encourage the CEO to work through the formal investor-engagement 
process with these committees to handle requests, inquiries, and 
communication.  The CLO’s fidelity to process can help prevent unnecessary 
exploitation of executive decision-making.144 
Recent statements by the Business Roundtable, the former chief justice of 
the Delaware Supreme Court, and other corporate influencers highlight the 
growing acceptance and consideration of broader stakeholder interests versus 
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 143. David Ruiz, 4 Tips for General Counsel Dealing with Shareholder Activists, LAW.COM 
(Aug. 14, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/insidecounsel/almID/ 
59925767140ba0fd4186ad16/ [https://perma.cc/GP8F-739P] (explaining that general counsel 
should explain to the board how to appropriately communicate with shareholder activists); see 
also Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16. 
 144. Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16; see MATTEO TONELLO & MATTEO 
GATTI, BOARD-SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT PRACTICES:  FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF SEC-
REGISTERED COMPANIES 42–43 (2019), https://www.conference-board.org/ 
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a narrow focus on shareholder primacy.145  In this climate, corporations are 
assessing their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) profiles and 
considering the related risks alongside other traditional performance 
metrics.146  CLOs must advise corporate managers to consider how ESG 
factors fit into the business strategy and help them respond to pleas to engage 
from impact investors and other stakeholders including the public.147  In the 
ESG- and stakeholder-focused context, the role of the CLO is likely elevated.  
In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, the CFO role rose 
in prominence.  But the shift toward a stakeholder focus might signal a shift 
toward an enhanced CLO role because of the strong connection between ESG 
and corporate operations (e.g., supply chains).148 
D.  Succession as the CLO’s Role and Legacy 
Risks to corporate value are immediate, short term, and long term.  And 
CLOs must be concerned with the continuity of quality legal support and 
advice for the client corporation during and after their tenure.  This continuity 
extends to the entire legal department.  CLOs need not view their immediate 
reports as successors but, ideally, facilitate and promote a talent development 
program throughout the legal organization.149  Without such a program, 
corporations are assuming avoidable risks.  A lack of succession planning for 
the legal department and other key corporate functions reflects suboptimal 
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risk management and, for some commentators, is an example of 
organizational failure.150  Admittedly, short-term incentives may impede 
succession planning.  CLOs may be overwhelmed by rigorous short-term 
demands, that is, “putting out fires.”  But CLOs and the client corporation 
should aspire to address succession-related risks for the entire corporate legal 
department. 
IV.  CHALLENGES 
There are multiple challenges to CLOs effectively executing their 
enhanced value-creating role.  This effectiveness is impacted by multiple 
factors, especially:  (1) a shared understanding between management and 
CLOs as to the latter’s role and (2) lawyer competence.151 
A.  Shared Understanding Between Management and CLOs of the CLO 
Role 
Structure matters.  It signals authority and limitations.152  Corporate 
reporting structures should allow for CLOs’ strategic engagement with 
management and other constituencies.  To achieve this, CLOs “must report 
to the board of directors or, at least, the CEO” because “[a]nything less than 
this will inhibit the functioning of the value-creation attributes that are vital 
to in-house counsel effectiveness.”153  Ideally, the CLO should have dual 
reporting lines to the board of directors and the CEO.  Alternative reporting 
structures where CLOs report to CFOs and other non-CEO C-suite members 
could constrain the ability of CLOs to address important risks.154  There is 
an ongoing tension among C-suite executives.  In recent years, CFOs have 
wielded significant power.  Yet the emergence of the CLO in the 
contemporary environment could be perceived as a threat to other C-suite 
members who may harbor profoundly different views toward risk 
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management, compliance, and professional ethics.155  Understandably, the 
enhanced strategic CLO role demands greater C-suite prominence and 
management endorsement. 
B.  CLO Competence:  The T-shaped Lawyer 
CLO competence matters.  The CLO of the future should have a skill set 
that resembles a T.156  Here, the vertical line represents acute legal acumen 
and the horizontal line represents additional competencies (e.g., 
procurement, finance, global enterprise risk management, technology, 
cultural savvy) that allow a lawyer to bridge multiple constituencies.157  
CLOs must behave and be “perceived to behave in ways that justify their 
presence.”158  Their professional competence extends beyond legal 
knowledge and technical skills:  it includes a fidelity to ethics and 
professional responsibility. 
Despite a heightened business focus, the enhanced CLO role advanced in 
this Essay remains consistent with legal ethics and lawyer professional 
identity.  CLOs provide unique value to the corporation due in significant 
part to their legal identity and commitments to the profession.  Thus, CLOs 
should remain lawyers, not professionals simply performing legal tasks.  
Ronald Gilson once asserted, “For those concerned about the future of the 
professional project, the growing prominence of inside counsel within the 
profession, reflecting their market power, is not a threat but an opportunity, 
perhaps our only one.”159  The emergence of CLOs in the contemporary 
environment, if approached properly, has the potential to elevate both 
corporations and the legal profession. 
CONCLUSION 
The dynamic and rapidly shifting contemporary global business 
environment requires an enhanced CLO role with a deeper set of 
competencies.  They include, inter alia, (1) sophisticated procurement 
capabilities, (2) an enhanced financial focus, and (3) a global enterprise risk-
management orientation.  Given their expanded skill set, contemporary 
CLOs can be more potent corporate officers creating value for the 
corporation and fulfilling an internal quasi-regulatory function benefiting 
multiple stakeholders. 
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